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2I INTRODUCTION 
 The doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation has lost its 
way. After examining many cases, there does not appear to be any 
consistency in applying the doctrine. It has been expanded by the 
courts to situations far beyond its initial application.  
 Scholars have suggested that the term be abandoned. The 
objective of this article is to show that, not only has the 
suggestion that the term be abandoned not gained momentum, but 
confirms a conclusion that misapplication of the doctrine has led 
to confusion. It offers a Flow Chart in an effort to help 
eliminate the doctrine’s misapplication. 
 
II WHAT IS DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION? 
 Simply stated, the doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation 
(hereafter DRR) means  
that where testator makes a new will revoking 
a former valid one, and it later appears that 
the new one is invalid, the old will may be 
re-established on the ground that the 
revocation was dependent upon the validity of 
the new one, testator preferring the old will 
to intestacy.2
2 Stewart v. Johnson, 194 So.869, at p. 870 (Fla. 1940), 
citing Redfern, Wills and Administration of Estates in Florida, § 
89, p. 121. In Estate of Tennant, 714 P.2d 122, 129 (Mont.1986), 
the court holds the testatrix’s will may not be ‘reinstated’...” 
Professor Byer (Wills, Trusts and Estates, Examples & 
Explanations Second Ed. (2002), Aspen Law & Business, ' 8.6.2) 
describes it as a ARomeo and Juliet@ revocation: Romeo=s intent to 
kill himself was conditioned on Juliet being dead; he would not 
have killed himself had he known Juliet had only taken a potion 
to simulate death.   
Professor deFuria describes the doctrine as a legal tool “to 
protect the testator...from his own folly.” 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
3The origins of the doctrine seem to go back to the early 
1716 English case of Onions v. Tyrer.3 Professor Warren, in his 
important article, Dependent Relative Revocation,4 attributes the 
origin of the term to A...Mr. Powell, who in 1788 gave currency 
to the phrase.@5 Professor Warren proposes the term be abandoned6
because it is A...loose and misleading...,@7 tending to treat 
A...different subjects under a single principle....@8 His 
conclusion was that the A...panacea of a sonorous phrase...has 
 
200, 201 (1989).     
 3 23 Eng. Rep. 1085 (1716). 
4 Joseph Warren, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 337 (1920) 
5 Id., at p. 337. “This principle, that the effect of the 
obliteration, canceling, etc., depends upon the mind with which 
it is done, having been pursued in all its consequences, has 
introduced another distinction not yet taken notice of; namely, 
that of dependent relative revocations, in which the act of 
canceling, etc., being done with reference to another act meant 
to be an effectual disposition, will be a revocation or not, 
according as the relative act is efficacious or not.” Powell on 
Devises, 1st Ed., p. 637. 
6 It is submitted that Professor Atkinson agrees: “Instead of 
this fiction of conditional revocation, it is more realistic to 
treat the problem as one of mistake, holding the revocation 
absolute or void in accordance with which position the individual 
testator would probably have preferred.” Atkinson on Wills 2nd 
Ed. (1953), § 88, p. 452. 
 7 Joseph Warren, supra, footnote 4, at p. 338. 
8 Id., at p. 338. See also Page, Parker & Schoenblum, Page on 
the Law of Wills (2003), §21.57: “This term has been criticized 
for the very reason that it enables these topics to be grouped 
together.”  
4only tended to obscure the common law...@ and led to confusion.9
An historical approach and background of the doctrine show 
its original intent.  
 
III BACKGROUND 
 In Onions v. Tyrer,10 the testator properly executed a first 
will, and four years later made another that expressly revoked 
the first. The testator=s wife, at his direction, then tore up 
the first will. The court held that the second will could not 
revoke the first because it was not properly executed. It further 
held that, although he canceled the first will by having it torn 
up, he only intended to do so, not by tearing it up, but by the 
later will. The Lord Chancellor held the tearing up might be a 
good revocation at law, but said, Ait ought to be relieved 
against, and the will set up again in equity, under the head of 
mistake.@11 In other words, the testator made a mistake which 
equity may correct. The defendants in Ford v. de Pontes12 
explained the decision thusly: A...[tearing up the first will] 
was done from an opinion that the second will had actually 
revoked the first, which induced the testator to tear that as of 
 9 Id., at p. 357.
10 Supra, footnote 3. 
11 23 Eng. Rep. 1085 (1716) 
12 54 Eng. Rep. 1012 (1861). 
5no use; therefore, if the first was not effectually revoked by 
the second, neither ought the act of tearing the first to revoke 
it.@13 
In Ford v. de Pontes,14 the court followed one of the 
holding in the Onions case in a different context. There, the 
testatrix executed a will devising real estate to Mr. de Pontes. 
She later executed deeds of the real estate to him. It was argued 
that the deeds were void because they were executed in 
consideration of future cohabitation between persons who were 
incapable of contracting a legal marriage.15 The court held that 
the deeds, regardless of whether they were invalid as being 
turpis contractus,16 did not revoke the will. The applicable 
Wills Act required that wills be revoked in a certain manner and 
the deeds were not so executed.17 He followed Onions in that an 
improperly executed instrument cannot revoke a properly executed 
will. 
 It is uncontroverted that an effective revocation of a will 
must consist of an act done co-existent with the intent to 
 13 Id., at p. 1018
14 Supra, footnote 12. 
15 She was validly married in England but divorced in Scotland, 
the divorce being declared invalid after her death. 
16 An immoral or iniquitous contract. Black’s Law Dictionary, 
6th Ed. 1990, p. 1517. 
 
17 A...[By] this section of the Act...a will can only be 
revoked by marriage, by express declaration in writing, or by 
burning, &c.@ Supra, footnote 12, at p. 1020. 
6revoke. Absent that Amarriage,@ there is no revocation. In Baucum 
v. Harper18, the court found the following instruction was not 
error: 
Joint operation of act and intention is 
necessary to revoke a will. The destroying of 
a will without intention to revoke it would 
not revoke the will, neither would the 
intention to destroy a will without actually 
doing so revoke the will; there must be 
both.19 
IV WHEN DRR SHOULD NOT BE AN ISSUE 
 It must be remembered that DRR does not apply to correcting 
a mistake as to the contents of the will,20 nor to correcting an 
omission of a provision not in a will. Historically, courts would 
not correct such a mistake or omission,21 although Professor 
Langbein points out that “[l]eading modern authority in a number 
of American states has now reversed the strict compliance and no 
 18 168 S.E. 27 (Ga. 1933) 
 19 Id., at p. 29; see also. T. Atkinson, Atkinson on Wills, § 
84, p. 421: “An oral attempt to revoke a will is inoperative 
however unquestionable the intent may be, unless attended by the 
requisite statutory manifestations,” i.e., an act. And at § 84, 
p. 421: “The testator’s physical acts which comply with the 
statute do not by themselves constitute a revocation. In addition 
there must be an intention to revoke.” 
 “All the destroying in the world, without intention, will 
not revoke a will; nor all the intention in the world, without 
destroying.” Cheese v. Lovejoy, 2 P.D. 251. 
 20 Estate of Barker, 448 So.2d 28 (1st DCA, Fla. 1984). DRR did 
not apply to revive a prior will where second will was validly 
executed, expressly revoked prior wills but omitted a residuary 
clause. 
 21 See Gray, Striking Words Out of a Will, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 212 
(1912-13).  
7reformation rules.”22 
DRR does not apply when the second will cannot be probated 
for one reason or another and the first will has not been 
physically revoked. The first will stands unrevoked and is the 
valid, probatable instrument. Thus it would appear that the 
manner of revocation of the first instrument is important. Merely 
having a second ineffective will should not bring DRR into play.  
 For example, in First Union National Bank of Florida v. 
Mizell,23 Mr. Mizell properly executed his will in 1978. In 1991, 
after contracting AIDS, his health began to deteriorate. In 1993, 
he executed a will but did not tear up or destroy the first one. 
The trial court held that the 1993 will was procured through 
undue influence, that Mizell was incompetent at the time, and 
that the 1978 will was revoked by the express revocation clause 
in the 1993 will. The appeals court reversed, holding the 1978 
will was not revoked by the 1993 will, even though it contained a 
clause expressly revoking the 1978 will. Since the 1993 will was 
invalid because of Mizell=s incompetency,24 it could not revoke 
 
22 John H. Langbein, Curing Execution Errors and Mistaken Terms 
in Wills, 18 Prob. & Prop. 28, 29. See, for example, Erickson v. 
Erickson, 716 A.2d 92 (Conn. 1998), where the court adopted Judge 
Peters= dissent in Connecticut Junior Republic v. Sharon 
Hospital, 488 A.2d 190 (Conn. 1982) and held that the will may be 
corrected for a mistake where it is established by clear and 
convincing evidence. This does not mean that the court will not 
accept parol evidence as to an ambiguous term in the will. 
 23 807 So.2d 78 (4th D.C.A., FL 2002)    
24 The court said the 1978 will could be offered for probate 
8the 1978 will. DRR was not discussed - the 1978 will had not been 
torn up.25 
V APPLICATION OF DRR 
 Professor Warren distinguishes Conditional Revocations and 
Revocations by Mistake. Condition is defined as a “[p]rovision 
making effect of [a] legal instrument contingent upon an 
uncertain event.”26 In other words, an event must happen before 
the instrument is effective. In the case of a true conditional 
revocation, DRR would not be applicable whether or not the 
condition occurs. If the condition occurs, the first will is 
effectively revoked; if it does not, the first will remains valid 
and DRR would not be applicable.27 In Bradish v. McClellan,28 the 
testator executed two wills, about one and one-half years apart, 
the latter of which contained charitable bequests. Shortly after 
 
but its validity could be contested in further proceedings. Id., 
at 80. 
25 Nor would DRR apply where the testator accidentally destroys 
his will believing he is destroying some other document - the 
necessary intent to destroy is clearly lacking.25 Professor 
Warren calls this a “Conditional Revocation by Act to the 
Document” and states that the document is not affected. John 
Warren, supra, footnote 4, at p. 338. 
 26 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., (1990), p. 293. 
 27 “The intent is not to revoke absolutely but only in case 
that some future event happens. There should be no difficulty 
about this sort of provision. The revocation operates if the 
condition is fulfilled, but not if the contrary should prove to 
be the case.” Atkinson on Wills 2d Ed. (1953) § 88, p. 453. 
 28 13 W.N.C. 3 (Pa. 1882).   
9executing the second, he executed a third writing purporting to 
be a codicil. It provided that if he died within three calendar 
months of executing the second will, the first should go into 
effect, otherwise the second would be his will. He died within 
ten days of executing the second will. The court said, “[a]s he 
died before [the designated date] the [second writing] did not 
take effect.”29 
A true condition is also illustrated in In re DeCoster’s 
Will.30 Testatrix executed a will leaving one-fourth of her 
estate of her son. She later prepared a handwritten codicil 
changing that bequest and substituted her daughters for her son. 
In that codicil she stated the changes would be effective if she 
died before the codicil was properly drawn by an attorney. The 
court said that the effectiveness of the handwritten codicil: 
should be construed as meaning [that] until 
such superseding instrument drawn by an 
attorney, [it] should become effective as a 
legally valid substitute for the presently 
executed document....The [handwritten] 
codicil...is clearly a conditional 
instrument, the effectiveness of which for 
any purpose would terminate upon the taking 
effect of the contemplated subsequent codicil 
prepared by an attorney.31 
On the other hand, a mistake “...exists when a person, under 
 
29 Id., at p. 5.
30 270 N.Y.S. 244 (1934) 
 31 Id., at p. 810.
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some erroneous conviction of law or fact, does...some act which, 
but for the erroneous conviction, he would not have done....”32 
Revocation by mistake can occur where the first instrument is 
physically revoked, it being the intent of the testator to have 
the second instrument be the valid will. It can also occur in the 
reverse case where the testator revokes a valid second will 
intending to revive the first will.33 
Onions v. Tyrer34 is the classic example of the situation 
where the second instrument attempts to entirely revoke the first 
but is not valid. The first will was properly executed but 
physically revoked. The court held that the first will, although 
it was revoked by having been torn up under the mistaken belief 
the second was valid, was revived. 
 Estate of Alburn35 is the classic example of the reverse 
case. Decedent executed a will in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, (the 
Milwaukee will) in 1955 leaving nothing to her next of kin. In 
1959, she moved to Kankakee, Illinois, and executed another will 
(the Kankakee will) naming only her brother, giving him less than 
one-tenth of his intestate share. She returned to Milwaukee in 
 32 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. (1990), p. 1001. 
 33 “In most cases, it is a revocation caused by mistake of law. 
This result has frequently been explained by the fiction of a 
condition.” Bowe, Parker & Schoenblum, Page on the Law of Wills 
(2003), § 21.57. 
 34 Supra, footnote 3. 
35 118 N.W.2d 919 (Wisc. 1963). 
 
11
1960 and tore up her Kankakee will stating she had “got rid of 
it.”36 There was testimony that, after the pieces were disposed 
of, she said she wanted the 1955 Milwaukee will “to stand.”37 The 
court applied DRR to revive the 1959 Kankakee will and admitted 
it to probate. The court cited the trial judge’s strong 
conviction she did not want to die intestate, she knew a copy of 
the Wisconsin will was on file with her attorney, she stated she 
wanted the Wisconsin will “to stand,” she took no steps after the 
destruction of the Illinois will to make a new will. 
We are constrained to conclude that the 
[facts are] sufficient evidence to support 
the finding that she destroyed the [Kankakee] 
will under the mistaken belief that the 
[Milwaukee] will would control the 
disposition of her estate.38 
In the same circumstances, Powell v. Powell39 did not revive 
the first will but revived the second one. The original will gave 
testator’s property to his grandson. The later will gave it to 
his nephew. After a falling out with his nephew, the testator 
destroyed the second will under the mistaken belief that the 
first one would be revived. When the testator died, the nephew 
offered the first will for probate, contending that DRR was 
applicable. The grandson argued that DRR was founded on the 
 36 Id., at p. 921.
37 Id., at p. 921.
38 Id., at p. 923.
39 L.R. 1 P. & D. 209 (1866). 
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desire to carry out the testator’s intention and that an 
intestacy would more nearly carry that out. The court disagreed 
and revived the second will. In applying DRR, the court said the 
“...animus revocandi had only a conditional existence, the 
condition being the validity of the paper intended to be 
substituted....”40 Since that condition, revival of the first 
will, did not occur, there was no revocation. As a result, the 
property went to the nephew, clearly an unintended result. 
 Sometimes a statute prevents the application of DRR. Despite 
the same circumstances as Powell v. Powell, a New York statute 
stood in the way of the court’s application of DRR to revive the 
first will in In re McCaffrey’s Estate.41 The statute42 provided 
that if a testator revokes a second will, the first will not be 
revived unless it appeared from the terms of the revocation that 
he intended to revive the first will43 or unless the first will 
is republished. The testator validly executed a will June 20, 
1938, and a second will, revoking the first one, December 20, 
1938. When found after the death of the testator, the second page 
of the second will was entirely obliterated by ink markings and 
at its end the testator had written that “any copy or duplicate 
 
40 Id., page number not available. 
 41 20 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1940). 
 42 Section 41 of the Decedent Estate Law. 
 43 This appears to be a slight variation of Uniform Probate 
Code 11th Ed., § 2-509, Revival of a Revoked Will. 
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is hereby annulled and cancelled – that a Will dated June 20, 
1938 may now be restored to full force and effect.”44 The court 
construed the statute strictly and said, “[t]he history of our 
statutes, the decisions and our public policy exclude the 
existence of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation as a 
rule of law in this State.”45 The court also found there was no 
indication as to when the notation was made and said, in effect, 
it could not determine that the testator’s intent to revive the 
first will appeared at the time of the revocation. The result of 
this case should be questioned because the intent of the testator 
was evident.  
 Arkansas had a similar statute.  In Larrick v. Larrick,46 
the testator destroyed his 1978 will shortly before he died 
suddenly in June 1979, and before having the opportunity to sign 
a new one. There was evidence that he was planning to make a new 
will, even before he destroyed the 1978 will, to the extent of 
telling a beneficiary of a planned bequest. The Probate Court 
applied DRR and revived the 1978 will. Although the appellate 
court discussed DRR, it reversed the Probate Court based on an 
Arkansas statute which provides a revoked will can only be 
revived by re-execution or by execution of another will 
 
44 Supra, footnote 41, at p. 181. 
 45 Supra, footnote 41, at p. 189. 
 46 607 S.W.2d 92 (Ark. 1980). 
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incorporating the old will by reference.47 
VI DRR GOING ASTRAY 
 Because of the distinction between condition and mistake, it 
is critical to categorize the facts correctly.48 Although DRR 
should be confined to cases of revocations by mistake, courts 
have construed the doctrine expansively and applied it where it 
was not appropriate.  
 In In re Kaufman=s Estate49, the testator, while domiciled in 
New York, executed a will in 1940. He moved to California and 
executed a will there in 1941. The wills were identical except 
for a change to a California executor. The testator wrote on the 
1940 will, Arevoked by reason of change of residence and 
difficulty [of the executor] to come to California and qualify.@50 
47 This will not be the result in states that have adopted the 
Uniform Probate Code. Section 2-509(a) provides for revival if 
the testator, by contemporary or subsequent declarations, intends 
the prior will to take effect as executed. 
 48 “It is, therefore, necessary in each case to study the act 
done by the light of the circumstances under which it occurred 
and the declarations of the testator with which it may have been 
accompanied” Powell v. Powell [L.R.] 1 P&D 209 (1866). 
 “Nothing but confusion can result from explaining mistake as 
condition; just as nothing but confusion can result from 
explaining breach of a covenant, impossibility, and the like, as 
a condition.” Bowe, Parker & Schoenblum, Page on the Law of Wills 
(2003), § 21.57. 
 
49 155 P.2d 831 (Cal. 1945). 
50 Id., at p. 833.
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The 1941 will was admitted to probate. However, because he died 
within 30 days of executing his new will, it was ineffective by 
operation of law under California statutes. Nevertheless, Justice 
Traynor applied DRR to revive the 1940 will. 
 In Kirkeby v. Covenant House,51 the testatrix executed a 
will in 1989 placing her estate in a trust. After disposing of 
the income, the corpus was to be distributed to a named charity. 
In 1992, she revised some of the provisions of the 1989 will, 
drafted a handwritten codicil, which, inter alia, named a 
different charity. The codicil was not properly executed.  A 
month later, she again decided to change her will. She marked 
through certain provisions of the will and codicil, added others 
and asked a neighbor to type it. When it was done, she signed it. 
Afterwards, she had it notarized. Witnesses signed at different 
times, not all present at the same time. The testatrix died in 
the fall of 1992. The trial court determined that the 1992 will 
and codicil were improperly executed, but that the testatrix did 
not die intestate. It applied the doctrine of DRR and the 
existing 1989 will remained valid and admitted it to probate. It 
said:  
Under the doctrine of dependent relative 
revocation, a court can probate a will that 
was revoked by a testator through the 
execution of a subsequent will where that 
subsequent will is later declared invalid.52 
51 970 P.2d 241 (Or.App. 1998). 
52 Id., at p. 244 in footnote 5. 
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Curiously, no party disputed the application of the 
doctrine. While the holding of Onions is not applicable (because 
the 1989 will was not torn up), there can be no quarrel with the 
result which would be the same if the doctrine were not applied, 
i.e., an improperly executed will (or codicil) cannot revoke a 
prior properly executed will. 
 In Churchill v. Allessio,53 the testatrix=s 1984 will was 
rejected by the jury for a variety of reasons: the signature was 
not hers, or she did not have the capacity to make a will, or she 
executed it under duress.54 Another document, dated in 1967, was 
found, purporting to be testatrix=s earlier will. The jury found 
that although the 1967 will was signed, it was revoked by the 
1984 will, but should be Aaccepted@ under the doctrine of DRR. 
The Appellate Court agreed to the doctrine’s expansion to a case 
in which the earlier will was not destroyed: 
The gist of the doctrine [of dependent 
relative revocation] is that if a testator 
cancels or destroys a will with a present 
intention of making a new one immediately and 
as a substitute and the new will is not made 
or, if made, fails of effect for any reason, 
it will be presumed that the testator 
preferred the old will to intestacy, and the 
old one will be admitted to probate in the 
absence of evidence overcoming the 
presumption.55 
53 719 A.2d 913 (Conn. 1998). 
54 Id., at p. 917.
55 Id., at p. 916.
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Georgia, as well, expanded the doctrine in Warner v. 
Reynolds.56 It was agreed that Ms. Warner=s 1990 will was not 
properly executed or witnessed. However, her son, left out of 
both wills, contended that a 1984 will had been revoked by the 
1990 will leaving his mother as an intestate and allowing him to 
inherit.  The trier of fact found the 1984 will was the valid and 
non-revoked will of Ms. Warner. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed:  
...if it is clear that the cancellation and 
the making of the new will were parts of one 
scheme, and the revocation of the old will 
was so related to the making of the new as to 
be dependent upon it, then if the new will be 
not made, or if made is invalid, the old 
will, though canceled, should be given 
effect, if its contents can be ascertained in 
any legal way....The doctrine of dependent 
relative revocation is one of presumed 
intent, and it remains the intent of the 
testatrix that is the crucial issue.57 
In all the above cases, the same result could have been 
accomplished by applying the first holding of Onions, that the 
second will could not revoke the first because it was not 
properly executed, rather than applying DRR. Judge Traynor could 
have relied on Onions in the Kauffman case and came to the same 
result. Kirkeby=s58 result would have been the same if the court 
simply said the 1992 will, because it was invalid, could not have 
 56 546 S.E.2d 520 (Ga. 2001). 
57 Id., at p. 522.
58 Supra, footnote 51. 
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revoked the 1989 will. Likewise the result in Churchill59 would 
have been the same since the 1967 will could not have been 
revoked by the 1984 will since it was inoperative. Warner60 is 
another example. There was no reason to apply DRR when the 1990 
will could not have been revoked by the 1984 ineffective will. 
 In the situations described above, it is apparent that DRR 
was not applicable because the earlier will was not revoked by an 
act - it was still physically intact. To apply DRR in such cases 
goes beyond Onions and illustrates the liberal application of the 
doctrine. Even though the outcomes in the cases would have been 
the same, it is just as important for the correct legal theory to 
be applied. Unless the correct legal theory is applied, the 
analysis is faulty.  
 Courts have even expanded Onions to apply to partial 
revocations.61 The 1873 English case of Goods of McCabe62 is an 
example. The testatrix provided a legacy to her niece, Edith 
Galsworthy rather than to testatrix’s sister, Louisa. At the 
time, Edith=s mother, Louisa, was seriously ill, thus the desire 
to name Edith as a legatee. When Louisa recovered, the testatrix 
Aprobably erased or attempted to erase@ Edith=s name from the will 
 59 Supra, footnote 53. 
60 Supra, footnote 56. 
61 Some states, e.g., Florida, only allow partial revocation of 
wills by an instrument executed with the formalities of a will 
and partial revocations by an act are not recognized.  
62 (1873) 3 L.R. P.& D. 94.  
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and substituted her sister=s name, the substitution not being 
valid. The court applied DRR and allowed probate of the will with 
Edith=s name restored. The court said: 
I cannot have a doubt that she would not have 
obliterated the name of that member of her 
family of the name of Galsworthy, which 
originally stood in the will, if she had not 
believed that she could validly substitute 
the name of her sister; and if this be so, 
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation 
is applicable.63 
In In re Jones,64 the residuary clause of testator=s 1969
will violated the rule against perpetuities and was held invalid. 
The residuary legatees of a valid 1965 will petitioned to 
substitute them for the stricken residuary legatees of the valid 
1969 will. The appellate court discussed the applicability of DRR 
and held that the residuary clause of the 1965 will could be 
probated with the valid provisions of the 1969 will under the 
doctrine of DRR. Even though prior Florida decisions Afound it 
difficult to envision a factual situation other than a codicil 
failure where a specific gift failure would result in revival or 
preservation of an earlier disposition,@65 the court found the 
prerequisites of DRR clearly existed.66 However, given that 
 63 Page number not available. 
64 352 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 1977). 
65 Id., at p. 1186. 
66 Those prerequisites are: 1) the intent of the testator not 
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courts disconnect provisions of a will, the same result could 
have been accomplished by holding that 1969's invalid residuary 
clause cannot revoke 1965's valid residuary clause, obviating 
against application of DRR.67 As pointed out earlier, application 
of the proper legal theory is important. 
 That decision runs contra to the 1865 case of Tupper v. 
Tupper.68 There, the testator, a priest, made charitable 
bequests. In a later properly executed codicil, he revoked 
several of the charitable bequests and substituted other 
charities who could not take. The court ruled that although the 
substituted beneficiaries could not take, the revocation was 
effective because the codicil was properly executed. The court 
refused to Aspeculate on whom [the testator] might wish to confer 
the benefit@ and distinguished Onions v. Tyrer:
...[I]t may be said that [there] it was the 
intention of the testator that the instrument 
should operate in an entire and not in a 
mutilated form; while in the other cases, 
where the testator [as here] has made certain 
gifts, which are invalid in law, the 
instrument is in a sense operative, but the 
 
to die intestate; 2) the intent of the testator that the 
revocation is conditionally qualified on the validity of the new 
disposition. Stated another way: the testator prefers the prior 
disposition if the new one fails for any reason. Id., at p. 1185. 
67 South Carolina applied DRR in the same situation and allowed 
the revival of a charitable gift in an earlier will when a change 
was made via codicil, which change violated the rule against 
perpetuities. Charleston Library Society v. Citizens & Southern 
National Bank, 20 S.E.2d 623 (S.C. 1942). 
68 69 Eng. Rep. 627 (1855). 
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party to take under it is not allowed to 
receive the benefit.69 
To the same effect is Crosby v. Alton Ochsner Medical 
Foundation.70 Testator validly executed a will on January 20, 
1971, leaving a bequest to a charity. After the will was 
executed, he directed that his September 11, 1970, will be 
destroyed. All the provisions in both wills were virtually 
identical. However, the bequest to the charity in the second will 
violated the state’s Mortmain Statute because the testator died 
within 90 days after executing the January 20, 1971, will. The 
foundation contended the provision as to the bequest to it in the 
1970 will could be revived under DRR. The Chancery Court applied 
DRR to revive the charitable bequest under the 1970 will 
principally because the provisions in both wills were virtually 
identical. The Supreme Court agreed that the charitable bequest 
in the 1971 will was void but reversed on the issue of reviving 
the charitable bequest under the 1970 will, holding it to be of 
no effect. It said:  
It is clear from what was said in [a prior] 
case that the doctrine of dependent relative 
revocation cannot be employed to revive a 
will that has been expressly revoked by the 
testator when the revocation is expressed in 
a subsequent will..., it is conclusive of the 
testator’s intent and evidence to show to the 
contrary is not admissible.71 
69 Id., at p. 628.
70 276 So.2d 661 (Miss. 1973). 
 71 Id., at p. 669. The court also referred to its earlier 
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In so holding, the court cited its earlier decision of Hairston 
v. Hairston72 and did not take the suggestion to overrule it. In 
Hairston, the testator executed a will in 1841 naming plaintiffs 
as beneficiaries. In 1852 he executed a second will naming a 
slave girl as principal beneficiary. The next day, he executed a 
third will naming the slave girl as beneficiary of his entire 
estate and died several hours later. The plaintiffs contended 
that their legacy under the 1841 will should be revived under 
DRR. The court refused to do so, saying that even though the 
slave could not inherit under either of the 1852 wills, the 1841 
will was inoperative because it was expressly revoked. The court 
pointed out that it was well settled that:  
...a will containing the express revocation 
clause and duly executed according to the 
statute, though prevented from taking effect 
for some matter dehors the will...is a 
revocation of a former will.73 
Maryland=s decision in Arrowsmith v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit 
 
decision in Crawford v. Crawford, 82 So.2d 823 (1955), which held 
the result would be the same even if there were no express 
revocation clause in the second validly executed instrument. 
There the court refused to apply DRR to revive a bequest of the 
entire estate to the testator’s sister under his first will. The 
second will gave the entire estate to his nephew but the nephew 
could not take because he was a witness to the second will. The 
result was an intestacy.  
 72 30 Miss. 276 (1855); the later Pennsylvania case of Price v. 
Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23 (1857) is to the same effect. 
 73 Crosby, supra, footnote 70, at p. 668. 
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and Trust Company74 also agrees with the principal of Tupper.
Decedent was donee of a power of appointment under his mother=s
1953 irrevocable deed of trust. He validly exercised the power in 
a 1966 will. He expressly revoked that will in a validly executed 
1976 will, also exercising the power of appointment. He expressly 
revoked the 1976 will in a validly executed 1982 will, also 
exercising the power of appointment. The testator died in 1983 
and the 1982 will was probated. The trustee of the 1953 trust was 
concerned that the exercise of the power in the 1982 will 
violated the rule against perpetuities and petitioned the court 
for instructions. The lower court agreed and as a result, 80 
percent of the 1953 corpus was invalidly appointed. The assets 
were ordered to be distributed to the takers in default under the 
1953 trust. It held that DRR did not apply to revive the 
appointment made under the 1966 will. The appeals court noted 
that the traditional purpose of DRR was based on the idea that 
courts can correct conditional revocations by the testator.75 
A...[T]he doctrine=s underlying theory of conditional revocation 
limits the relief which a court can grant.@76 In order to apply 
 74 545 A.2d 674 (Md. 1988). 
75 It is appropriate to note here that the case proves 
Professor Warren’s conclusion that there is confusion in the 
application of the doctrine. The court speaks in terms of 
“conditional revocation” when it should be talking in terms of a 
revocation by mistake. 
 76 Id., at p. 681.
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the doctrine, the court would first have to find that the 
testator preferred the 1976 exercise over the 1982 exercise, so 
that the 1976 will was never unconditionally revoked - but the 
1976 exercise suffered the same invalidity as the 1982 will. To 
cure that defect, the court would have to find that the testator 
preferred the 1966 exercise over the 1976 exercise, requiring the 
1966 will to be probated in its entirety. This the court would 
not do.77 The court found that the A...substantial differences 
between the wills prevent ruling that the 1966 will was only 
conditionally revoked by the 1982 will, even if it were 
conditionally revoked by the 1976 will.@78 It is clear that 
Maryland through Arrowsmith does not reject the application of 
DRR even though A[n]o reported Maryland appellate decision has 
ever applied it.@79 
DRR has even been applied where there was no second 
 
77 AIt is not the judicial function to select some provisions 
from column A and some provisions from column B in order to put 
together a valid will.@ Id., at p. 682; APlucking the 
perpetuities saving clause from the 1966 will and inserting it in 
the 1982 will is inconsistent with the theoretical justification 
of the doctrine.@ Id., at p. 680. 
78 Id., at p. 683.
79 Id., at p. 679. In favorably citing other cases (In re 
Bernard=s Settlement, 1 Ch. 552 (1916); In re Kaufman=s Estate, 
155 P.2d 831 (Cal.1945); Charleston Library Society, supra,
footnote 67; Blackford v. Anderson, 286 N.W. 735 (Iowa 1939)), 
the court would apparently apply it in an appropriate case. As of 
early 1998, Maryland had still not applied the doctrine. See 
Kroll v. Nehmer, infra, footnote 90.   
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instrument at all. In In the Matter of Raisbeck=s Will,80 the 
testator, an attorney, contemplating making a new will, made 
penciled alterations of his 1897 will,81 which would give rise to 
a presumption of revocation. However, because the new will had 
not been drawn, the will as originally written was probated when 
he died in 1905, using the doctrine of DRR. The court said it was 
a
custom in [the legal] profession unwise as it 
may be, to indicate upon the old instrument 
the changes that are to be made in the new, 
while the old instrument is still in 
force....We have unquestionably a presumption 
that the testator desired to make a new 
will....It is clear that [the testator] did 
not intend to die intestate....we can see in 
the mind of the testator an intention to hold 
to the old will until the new one was an 
accomplished fact....The circumstances would 
seem to justify the application of the rule 
of dependent relative revocation.82 
In Dixon v. The Solicitor of the Treasury,83 there was also 
no second instrument but the time span between the revocation and 
the attempt to make a new will was shorter. Testator executed a 
will in 1894. A few days before his death in 1904, he went to his 
solicitor to make a new will and gave the solicitor instructions, 
his sole purpose being to increase a certain legacy. The 
 80 102 N.Y.S. 967 (1906). 
81 There was no indication as to whether the alterations were 
made at one time or over a period of years. 82 Id., at p. 969-970. 
83 (1905) P. 42. 
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testator, despite the remonstrance of his solicitor, cut off his 
signature on the 1894 will, believing such cancellation was a 
necessary step preliminary to making a new one. The new will was 
prepared, the solicitor using the old one as a model, but the 
testator died shortly thereafter and before it was executed. In 
instructing the jury, the court said: 
It is obvious that the testator intended to 
make a new will, and did not intend that the 
Crown should take his property. He sent for 
his solicitor to take his instructions for a 
new will, The testator there and then cut out 
his own signature with a pair of scissors. It 
was just one of those stupid acts without 
which this Court might almost cease to exist. 
There is no doubt that the testator did what 
he did because he was making a new will....It 
follows that he would not have cut out his 
signature if he had thought that it would 
have the effect of making him die 
intestate.84 
The jury found the testator did not intend to revoke the will by 
cutting out his signature, and that his intent was that the 
revocation was conditional on his executing a new will. Thus 
without mentioning the doctrine directly, the court effectively 
instructed the jury on the theory of DRR. 
 
VII AINTENT@ OF DRR
It can be seen from the cases beginning with Onions that the 
application of DRR is not a mere mechanical act. The historic 
intent was paramount there and has remained so. A...[H]e did it 
 84 Id., page number not available. 
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only upon a supposition that he had made a latter [valid] 
will....@85 The court viewed the revocation as evidence of a 
presumed intent, implied from the circumstances.86 That the 
testator’s intent remains a paramount factor is confirmed in In 
re Kaufman=s Estate.87 As Justice Traynor stated it: AThe doctrine 
is designed to carry out the probable intention of the testator 
when there is no reason to suppose that he intended to revoke his 
earlier will if the later will became inoperative.@88 
This presumed intent89 is expressed in various ways. Kroll 
v. Nehmer90 articulates that the testator would have preferred 
the revoked will if by its non-revival, his estate would have 
passed by intestacy.91 Again, in Arrowsmith:
If a later will which expressly revokes 
earlier wills itself fails in whole or in 
part, the doctrine requires a court to decide 
 85 Onions v. Tyrer, supra, footnote 3, at p. 1018.  
86 When there is actual evidence that reveals testator=s
intent, the presumption is rebutted and DRR is not applicable. In 
re Estate of Laura, 690 A.2d 1011, 1014 (1997). 
87 Supra, footnote 49. 
88 Id., at p. 833.
89 The presumption is a rebuttable one. AThe application of 
this doctrine would give rise to a rebuttable presumption that 
the testator would have preferred to revive his earlier 
charitable bequests rather than let the property go by 
intestacy.@ In re Estate of Pratt, 88 So.2d 499, 501 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1977). 
 90 705 A.2d 716 (Md. 1998). 
91 Id., at p. 720.
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whether the decedent would have preferred the 
prior will to the result under the later 
will, which may be partial invalidity or 
intestacy.92 
The court in In re Macomber’s Will93 formulated it as 
follows: A[t[he rule seeks to avoid intestacy where a will has 
once been duly executed and the acts of the testator in relation 
to its revocation seem conditional or equivocal.@ And in Pratt v. 
Pratt,94 “[t]he application of this doctrine would give rise to 
the rebutable presumption that the testator would have preferred 
to revive his earlier charitable bequests rather than let the 
property go by intestacy.”95 
Finally, as Professor Warren observed: A[t]he inquiry should 
always be: What would the testator have desired had he been 
informed of the true situation?@96 And, “...the revocation is 
ineffective if the testator would not have revoked his will had 
he known the truth.”97 
Pratt98 has language to the same effect:  
 92 Supra, footnote 74, at p. 681. 
93 87 N.Y.S.2d 308, 312 (1949). 
94 88 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1956). 
 95 Id., at p. 501.
96 Supra, footnote 4, p. 345. 
97 Dukeminier, Johanson, Lindgren & Sitkoff, 7th Ed., Aspen 
Publishers, 2005, p. 259.  
 98 Supra, footnote 94. 
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...if the testator by codicil, revokes a 
portion of a prior testamentary instrument 
and makes a substituted disposition under a 
mistake of fact or law with the result that 
the later disposition is invalid, the prior 
disposition is revived on the theory that had 
the testator not been mistaken in his belief 
he would not have revoked the original 
gift.99 
VIII HOW IS INTENT DETERMINED? 
 It=s one thing to say that intent controls but another to 
discover that intent. Courts have said over and over that, in 
their search for the testator=s intent to avoid intestacy, Aall 
the surrounding circumstances@100 are considered. Kroll recites 
some of the factors: 
...the manner in which the existing will was 
revoked, whether a new will was actually made 
and, if so, how contemporaneous the 
revocation and the making of the new will 
were, parol evidence regarding the testator=s
intentions, and the differences and 
similarities between the old and new wills.101 
The similarity of the provisions seem to carry the most 
 
99 Id., at p. 501.
100 In their search, Athe court must confine its inquiry to the 
testamentary documents before it without resort to extrinsic 
evidence.” Wehrheim v. Golden Pond Assisted Living Facility, 905 
So.2d 1002 (Fla. 2005). 
 101 Supra, footnote 90, p. 722. 
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weight in determining the testator=s intent to avoid intestacy.102 
Some examples will confirm this. 
 In Kaufman,103 the provisions in the two wills were identical 
except for the change of executors which was necessitated by the 
testator=s move from New York to California. Justice Traynor 
said, AWhen a testator repeats the same dispositive plan in a new 
will, revocation of the old one by the new is deemed inseparably 
related to and dependent upon the legal effectiveness of the 
new.@104 He applied DRR because the provisions were virtually 
identical. 
 In Hauck v. Seright,105 the similarity of the provisions of 
the testatrix=s October 27, 1992, will and her October 30, 1992 
will, were similar enough to allow the revoked October 27 will to 
be revived under DRR. The jury found that the testatrix Awas not 
free from undue influence...when she executed her October 30, 
1992 Will.@106 The Montana Supreme Court found that the wills 
 102 As early as Onions v. Tyrer, this was a factor: “...and both 
wills, as to the main, were much to the same effect, and with 
little variation as to the disposition of the real estate.” 
Supra, footnote 3, at p.  1085. 
 103 Supra, footnote 49. 
104 Id., at p. 834.
105 964 P.2d 749 (Mt. 1998); there is no indication in the case 
that the October 30 will contained an express clause revoking 
prior wills. 
 106 Id., at p. 752.
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differed only as to the relative shares to be received by the 
plaintiff and defendant107 and that the lower court did not err by 
applying DRR to revive the October 27 will.  
 Wehrheim108 is to the same effect: 
If the later revoked will is sufficiently 
similar to the prior will, then the courts 
can more easily indulge the presumption that 
the testator intended the revocation of the 
former will to be conditional on the validity 
of the later will and that the testator 
prefers the provisions of the former will 
over intestacy. 
 
Professor Hirsch agrees with the emphasis given by courts to 
similarities in wills as a way of establishing intent: 
...[C]ourts...have deemed the revocation of 
the prior will conditional upon the 
effectiveness of the new will, if the prior 
will comes closer to the testator=s desired 
estate plan than would intestate 
distribution.109 
On the other hand, courts will not presume an intent to 
avoid intestacy where the provisions in the wills are not 
similar. In Arrowsmith,110 the court did not apply DRR because  
 107 The plaintiff argued that, because the provisions were 
Astrikingly dissimilar,@ DRR did not apply and therefore the 
earlier October 27 will was revoked. The court commented there 
was no authority for this type of reverse application of the 
doctrine. Id., at p. 754. 
108 Wehrheim, supra, footnote 100, at p. 1008. See also, 
Kaufman, supra, footnote 49. 
 109 Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance Law, Legal Contraptions, and the 
Problem of Doctrinal Change, 79 Oregon L. Rev. 527, 555 (2000).  
110 Supra, footnote 74. 
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A...substantial differences between the wills prevent ruling that 
the 1966 will was only conditionally revoked by the 1982 will, 
even if it were conditionally revoked by the 1976 will.@111 The 
differences were remarkable. Comparing the provisions of the two 
wills the court found that the 1966 will appointed $5,000 to each 
of sixteen individuals, none of whom took under the 1982 will; 
the 1982 will appointed gifts to sixteen charities only two of 
which were mentioned in the 1966 will; the 1966 will made no 
provision for the testator’s wife, whereas the 1982 will 
appointed $10,000 per year to her; his 1966 will made no gifts to 
charities from his personal estate, whereas the 1982 will 
bequeathed twenty percent to charities; his 1982 will appointed 
two trustees instead of the one appointed in his 1966 will. 
 The result in Rosoff v. Harding112 was the same. There 
testatrix executed a power of attorney given her by her brother. 
The power was required to be exercised in a specific manner. The 
brother died in 1982. After he died, she executed a will in 1982 
and exercised the power in accordance with its terms. She 
properly executed a second will in 1991 which revoked the 1982 
will. That will also properly exercised the power. Her third will 
was properly executed in 2000 but did not properly exercise the 
power. The court expressly did not apply DRR. It found no 
indication that she would prefer its exercise over intestacy and 
 111 Supra, footnote 74, at p. 683. 
112 901 So.2d 1006 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 2005). 
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that her entire estate planning scheme was substantially changed 
by the last will. The dissimilarities prevented the application 
of DRR. 
 Neither did the court apply DRR in Estate of Tennant.113 
There the testatrix executed a will in February, 1972, leaving 
specific devises to several charities and the remainder in trust 
for scholarships at the local high school. Beginning in 1981 she 
hired owners of a yard service and over the next year regarded 
their relationship as “more than that of employer and 
employee.”114 She executed a new will in August 1982, in favor of 
the owners of the yard service. During 1981-1982, her health and 
mental state deteriorated. When she died in January 1984, the 
1982 will was offered for probate. The court found it was void 
for undue influence but did not apply DRR to revive the 1972 
will. In order to apply DRR, the court said: 
...[A]n essential element of this doctrine is 
that the new will and the old will of the 
testator must reflect essentially the same 
dispositive plan. In the instant case, Mae’s 
new will and old will clearly do not reflect 
the same dispositive plan.115 
The court in so ruling found no evidence that the decedent would 
have preferred her property being distributed under the old will 
rather than being distributed under the intestacy statute, one of 
 113 714 P.2d 122 (Mont. 1985). 
 114 Id., at p. 123.
115 Id., at p. 129.
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the requirements of DRR. The opinion does not provide information 
as to her next of kin, only that she had no children and that her 
husband had predeceased her. Without that information, it is 
difficult to say the court was not correct.  
 Another important qualification of the rule is that DRR 
cannot apply when the destruction is unconditional. In Briscoe v. 
Allison,116 the testator tore his will into many parts at the 
breakfast table in the presence of his ex-wife and a nephew, 
saying “I am tearing my will up.”117 The pieces were left on the 
table and were taped together by his ex-wife. After testator’s 
death shortly thereafter, the taped together will was offered for 
probate. The court did not apply DRR to revive it because “there 
is no evidence that the testator at the time he tore his will to 
pieces had in mind substituting a new will in its place.”118 There 
was some evidence that the testator, about ten months before his 
death, wanted to make changes to his will. But the court said,  
Just how soon after this revocation he 
expected to execute one or the other of these 
wills, or some other will, no one can say. In 
these circumstances is it not more reasonable 
to conclude that he had abandoned the idea 
altogether?119 
116 290 S.W. 2d 864 (1956). 
 117 Id., at p. 866.
118 Id., at p. 866.
119 Id., at p. 867.
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The court was correct in Rauschenberger v. Greenwald120 when 
it did not apply DRR. The testator executed a will in 1973. He 
executed a second will in 1988 expressly revoking his prior will. 
It disappeared sometime after it was executed and the time the 
testator died. A copy was not admitted to probate. The 1973 will 
could not be revived under the Iowa statute but it was argued 
that it was revived under DRR, i.e., that the revocation of the 
1973 will was conditioned on the 1988 will being effective. The 
court disagreed. It said, “There is no evidence of [the 
testatrix’s] intent, at the time she wrote her 1988 will, that 
the revocation was conditioned on any future contingencies....The 
doctrine is inapplicable....”121 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re Emernecker’s Estate 
did not apply the doctrine even though it said not to apply it 
“seems to be a hard case, but there is no remedy, without making 
the bad law which such cases are said to invite.”122 The testatrix 
properly executed a will in 1903 that left nothing to her 
children. Her neighbors convinced her that, to be valid, she had 
to leave at least one dollar to disinherit her children. Since 
she was “a person of little education and very susceptible to the 
influence of her friends and neighbors...,” she tore up and 
burned the will. She died about a week later before she could 
 120 584 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa 1998). 
 121 Id., at p. 296.
122 67 A. 701, 702 (Pa. 1907). 
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execute another. The court did not apply DRR. It agreed with the 
language of the lower court: 
She was aware that, until this new will was 
executed, she was without any will at all, 
and the time of execution was left 
indefinite. Her friend was to call the “first 
fine day” to go with her to have it drawn. 
This was merely the expression of an 
unwritten intention to do something in the 
future....123 
As suggested earlier, there does not appear to be any 
consistency in applying DRR resulting in confusion. It has been 
applied when there is a true condition, to revive a second will, 
to revive a first will when it has not been destroyed, to revive 
a first will when the second will was ineffective and could not 
have revoked the first will, to partial revocations, and where 
there was no second will.  
 DRR has lost its way. With there being no consistency among 
the cases, what assistance can be developed to analyze the facts 
so DRR is more easily understood and properly applied? What is 
important is that the proper legal theory be applied with the 
correct analysis to arrive at a “right” result.  
 
IX A COHERENT APPROACH TO DRR – A FLOW CHART 
 An approach begins with the assumption that there is a valid 
will. The next step considers whether the second instrument, with 
an express revocation clause, is probatable. If there are no 
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defects in the instrument, it is clear that the first will is 
revoked and DRR would not be applicable even if the second will 
is later revoked.  
 In the event there is a defect in the instrument, it would 
not be probatable. The defect could be faulty execution, undue 
influence, duress, etc. Then we face the question of what the 
testator did with the first will. If it is still in physical 
existence, it would not be revoked since an invalid instrument 
cannot revoke a validly executed one. DRR would not be applicable 
and the first will would be probated. 
 DRR would come into the discussion when the testator 
physically revokes the first will, i.e., he tears it up, he burns 
it, etc. At that point there are three alternatives. First, he 
did it deliberately without any intent of preparing a new one. In 
that instance, the will remains revoked and the testator would 
die intestate. Secondly, he did it conditioned on the happening 
of a subsequent event, i.e., a true condition. Whether or not the 
condition occurs, DRR would not be applicable. If the condition 
occurs, the first will is revoked and cannot be revived. If the 
condition does not occur, the first will is not revoked. In both 
cases, DRR would not be applicable. 
 Third, he could have physically revoked the first will 
because he was mistaken as to a fact or a matter of law. Here is 
where DRR is properly applicable. The question becomes what was 
 123 Id., at p. 702. 
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the testator’s presumed intent in revoking the first will? Would 
he have revoked it had he known the truth? Was the destruction 
and execution of the new will contemporaneous? How close in time 
were those acts? Is there one scheme evident in the destruction 
of the first will and execution of the new will? How similar are 
the provisions in both wills? Would the testator have preferred 
intestacy over the first will?  
 In deciding that question, all the facts and circumstances are 
considered. If the facts show the testator intended to revive the 
first will, it is probated; otherwise it is not. In the event the 
testator does not execute a second will (perhaps because he died 
immediately after the will’s destruction), one would proceed with 
the analysis asking what the testator’s presumed intent was. 
The following Flow Chart is offered: 
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X CONCLUSION 
 The term DRR has been around for more than two hundred years 
and there is probably no inclination to restrict its use. Perhaps 
the courts will not ever take Prof Warren=s advice and do away 
with that appellation.124 And perhaps courts will continue to 
expand the doctrine resulting in more confusion. However, it can 
be seen from the Flow Chart that the more important decision is 
whether the first will can be revived125, not whether its 
revocation can be rescinded. Hopefully the Flow Chart will aid 
the proper analysis of the issues and limit the doctrine’s 
applicability to the proper situation. 
 124 Restatement of Property (Third) (1996) renames DRR the 
Doctrine of Ineffective Revocation, § 4.3, but note that it is 
revocation that is still emphasized. Perhaps a better appellation 
should be Retroactive Revival. 
 125 The importance of “revival” is evident from the time of the 
doctrine’s origin in Onions v. Tyrer where the court said that 
the will, torn up by mistake, “will be set up again in equity.” 
Supra, footnote 3. 
